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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in
an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. Whereas the eﬃcient ﬁrm (con-
sumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the ﬁrms
choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the ﬁrm
(consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it
can exclude its competitor from the market. Hence, the rankings of
expected proﬁt and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm is possible. Although the eﬃcient ﬁrm has stronger
incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there
remain cases in which the ﬁrm conceals information in equilibrium
to induce exit.
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Non-colluding Cournot competitors have an incentive to share information about in-
dependent production costs, if they use accommodating output strategies in the prod-
uct market (Fried, 1984, Gal-Or, 1986, and Shapiro, 1986). In this case, information
sharing decreases the expected consumer surplus (Shapiro, 1986).
This paper shows that these result depend on the presumption that ﬁrms use ac-
commodating strategies in the product market. The previous results may be reversed
when ﬁrms do not always use accommodating strategies. If a ﬁrm’s average tech-
nology is suﬃciently productive to exclude a competitor from the market, then the
ﬁrm no longer has an incentive to share cost information. In such a case a ﬁrm with
below-average costs will be indiﬀerent between information sharing and information
concealment, since in any case the ﬁrm excludes its competitor from the market. A
ﬁrm with high costs may strictly prefer to conceal its cost, since it avoids sharing the
market with the competitor by doing so.
If cost concealment yields market exclusion, then it may be harmful for consumers,
since it raises the average price, and eliminates product variety. In this case informa-
tion sharing would make consumers better oﬀ on average. In short, also the surplus
ranking may be reversed if exclusionary outputs are feasible for a ﬁrm.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the model. The
third section discusses the equilibrium strategies (i.e., output levels, and information
disclosure), and compares the expected consumer surplus under information sharing
and concealment. Section 4 analyzes the incentives of a ﬁrm that discloses information
strategically. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. The proofs of the propositions
are relegated to the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
Two risk-neutral ﬁrms play a game with three stages. Firm 1 has private information
about its cost of production, θ1. Firm 2’s cost, θ2, is common knowledge.
In the ﬁrst stage, before ﬁrm 1 learns its cost, the ﬁrm chooses whether to share
t h ec o s ti n f o r m a t i o n ,i . e . ,d(θ1)=θ1 for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ], or to keep it secret and send
an uninformative message, i.e., d(θ1)=∅ for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ].1
1The assumptions that ﬁrms precommit to an information sharing rule, and that information
is veriﬁable, are common in the literature on oligopolistic information sharing (e.g., see Kühn and
Vives, 1995, and Vives, 1999, for surveys). Adopting the same assumptions facilitates the comparison
1Subsequently, in the second stage, ﬁrm 1 draws a cost θ1 ∈ [θ,θ] from p.d.f.
f :[ θ,θ] → IR + (and corresponding c.d.f. F :[ θ,θ] → [0,1]) with full support (i.e.,
f(θ1) > 0 for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ]), and discloses or conceals the cost parameter in accordance
with the ﬁrst-stage choice.
Finally, in the third stage, the ﬁrms compete in the product market. The ﬁrms
simultaneously choose their output levels, xi ≥ 0 for ﬁrm i with i =1 ,2 (Cournot
competition).
The representative consumer’s utility from consuming bundle (x1,x 2) is:











Hence, the inverse demand for the good of ﬁrm i is linear, i.e. Pi(xi)=α −xi −βxj,
where xi ≡ (xi,x j) is the bundle of outputs of ﬁrms i and j, respectively, and i,j ∈
{1,2} with i 6= j. Parameter β represents the degree of product substitutability, with
0 <β≤ 1. The proﬁto fﬁrm i with cost θi is (i,j ∈ {1,2} with i 6= j):
πi(xi;θi)=( α − xi − βxj − θi)xi. (2)












The parameter values should satisfy the following conditions:
3α>4θ − θ (4)
and
e θ(θ) <θ 2 < e θ(θ) (5)





(2 − β)α + βθ1
¶
(6)
Conditions (4)-(5) guarantee that ﬁrm 1 is always active in the market. Condition
(5) guarantees that exclusion of ﬁrm 2 happens in some but not all of the cases.2
I solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to perfect Bayesian equilibria.
with existing results. Section 4 analyzes the extension where ﬁrm 1 makes the information sharing
choice after it learns the cost realization.
2By contrast, if θ2 ≤ e θ(θ), then the standard analysis applies. Both ﬁrms choose accomodating
output strategies, and ﬁrm 1 shares all information in the unique equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Further, if θ2 ≥ e θ(θ),t h e nﬁrm 2 never has an incentive to produce, and therefore information
discosure has no eﬀect on ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt. Consequently, ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between information
sharing and information concealment.
23 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section I solve the model backwards. First, I characterize the ﬁrms’ output
strategies. Second, I compare ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt and the consumer surplus under infor-
mation sharing and concealment.
3.1 Output Strategies
Distinguish two cases. First, suppose that ﬁrm 1 shares information. Proﬁt-maximization
by ﬁrm i gives the following ﬁrst-order condition (for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j):
xi(xj;θi)=
½ 1









xd(θ1,θ 2), if θ2 ≤ e θ(θ1)







xd(θ2,θ 1), if θ2 ≤ e θ(θ1)
0, if θ2 > e θ(θ1)
(9)














(α − θ1) (11)
Second, if ﬁrm 1 does not share information about its cost, then ﬁrm 2 expects the
cost E{θ1} of ﬁrm 1. Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrm 1 gives the best-response function
x1(x2;θ1) as in (7). The best-response of ﬁrms 2 is x2(E{x1(θ1)};θ2) as in (7). After







2(4−β2) , if θ2 ≤ e θ(E{θ1})





2 as in (9).




Now I solve the ﬁrst stage of the game where ﬁrm 1 chooses whether to share or
conceal information about its cost before it learns the cost θ1.


















(θ2) ≡ [2θ2 − (2 − β)α]/β is the inverse of e θ(·). Firm 2 conditions its output
choice on the information about the cost of ﬁrm 1. If ﬁrm 1 is relatively eﬃcient (i.e.,
θ1 ≤ e θ
−1
(θ2)), then ﬁrm 2 exits, and ﬁrm 1 earns the monopoly proﬁt πm.I f , o n
the other hand, ﬁrm 1 is less eﬃcient (i.e., θ1 > e θ
−1
(θ2)), then the ﬁrms choose
accommodating output strategies, and ﬁrm 1 earns the duopoly proﬁt πd.













, if e θ(θ) ≤ θ2 < e θ(E{θ1})
E{πm(θ1)}, if e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ)
(14)
After information concealment ﬁrm 2 cannot condition its output on the actual cost
of ﬁrm 1, but needs to rely on the expected cost. If ﬁrm 2’s cost is suﬃciently
l o wi nc o m p a r i s o nw i t hﬁrm 1’s average cost (i.e., θ2 < e θ(E{θ1})), then the ﬁrms
choose accommodating outputs, and ﬁrm 1 earns (distorted) duopoly proﬁts for all
cost parameters θ1 ∈ [θ,θ].I ft h ec o s tθ2 is equal to or above e θ(E{θ1}),t h e nﬁrm 2
exits the market and ﬁrm 1 earns the monopoly proﬁt for all cost parameters θ1.
The comparison of these expected-proﬁt functions gives the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists a critical θ
o,w i t he θ(θ) <θ
o < e θ(E{θ1}),s u c ht h a tﬁrm
1 conceals information in equilibrium if and only if θ
o <θ 2 < e θ(θ).
The intuition for this result is simple. If the cost of ﬁrm 2 is suﬃciently high (i.e.,
θ2 ≥ e θ(E{θ1})), then ﬁrm 1 can earn the monopoly proﬁt for any cost parameter
θ1 by choosing cost concealment, since ﬁrm 2 exits the market under information
concealment. Firm 1 expects a lower proﬁt from information sharing, since it cannot
always exclude ﬁrm 2 from the market under information sharing. In particular, the
ﬁrm earns duopoly proﬁts after it shares information about relatively high costs, i.e.,
θ1 > e θ
−1
(θ2). Therefore, the ﬁrm prefers cost concealment.
If the ﬁrm 2’s cost is lower than e θ(E{θ1}),t h e nﬁrm 1 faces the following trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, information sharing makes ﬁr m2am o r e“ a g g r e s s i v e ”c o m p e t i t o r
4(i.e., x∗
2(θ2;θ1) >x o
2(θ2;E{θ1})), if ﬁr m1h a sac o s tp a r a m e t e rθ1 >E {θ1}.O nt h e
other hand, ﬁrm 2 becomes less “aggressive” in the product market after information
sharing, i.e., x∗
2(θ2;θ1) <x o
2(θ2;E{θ1}),i fθ1 <E {θ1}. The gain from information
sharing is truncated, since ﬁr m2e x i t st h em a r k e tw h e nﬁr m1h a st h em o s te ﬃcient
cost parameters (i.e., θ1 ≤ e θ
−1
(θ2)). Therefore, the former eﬀect outweighs the latter,
if θ2 is suﬃciently close to e θ(E{θ1}).
The proﬁt ranking of Proposition 1 diﬀers dramatically from the ranking of a ﬁrm
that uses accommodating output strategies in the product market. Whereas a ﬁrm
has an incentive to share information when the ﬁrms choose accommodating output
strategies (e.g., see Fried, 1984, Gal-Or, 1986, and Shapiro, 1986), the ﬁrm has an
incentive to conceal information when exit matters.
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀects of information sharing through the equilibrium out-
puts. The thin lines are the best response curves of ﬁrm 1. The bold lines are the
x2(x1;θ2)
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of information sharing
best response curves of ﬁrm 2. First, Figure 1(a) illustrates the eﬀects for accom-
modating ﬁrms. Information disclosure enables ﬁrm 2 to adjust its output levels to
the actual eﬃciency level of ﬁrm 1. The equilibrium outputs lie along the line A-B.
For example, if ﬁrm 1 discloses the highest (lowest) cost level, then the equilibrium is
reached in point A (B). After cost concealment, ﬁrm 2 sets output level xo
2,w h i c hi s
t h eb e s tr e s p o n s et oﬁrm 1’s expected output level (point E in Figure 1a). Firm 1’s
5best response to output level xo
2 gives equilibrium output levels along the line C-D. In-
formation sharing increases ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt, since it creates a mean-preserving
spread, and proﬁts are convex in the ﬁrm’s output level.
Second, Figure 1(b) illustrates the eﬀects of information sharing when ﬁrm 1 can
exclude its competitor from the market if θ1 is low. Again, disclosure yields some
output adjustments by ﬁrm 2, i.e., the ﬁrms set equilibrium outputs along the kinked
line A0-K-B0. Firm 2’s output adjustments create a spread of ﬁrm 1’s output levels
corresponding to the vertical distance between A0 and B0. Information concealment
excludes ﬁrm 2 from the market (i.e., xo
2 =0 ), and creates a smaller spread of ﬁrm 1’s
outputs (i.e., outputs along the line B0-C0). Even tough information sharing creates a
bigger output spread for ﬁrm 1, it does not increase the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt. This is
the case since information disclosure reduces ﬁrm 1’s average output. In other words,
the mean is not preserved.
The comparison of consumer surplus under full and no information sharing is
































, if e θ(θ) ≤ θ2 < e θ(E{θ1})
E {S (xm(θ1),0)}, if e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ)
(16)
Comparing these surpluses gives the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists a critical θ
∗,w i t he θ(θ) <θ
∗ < e θ(E{θ1}), such that the
expected consumer surplus is higher with information sharing if θ
∗ <θ 2 < e θ(θ),a n d
higher without information sharing otherwise.
The intuition is similar to the intuition for Proposition 1. If θ2 ≥ e θ(E{θ1}),t h e n
information concealment yields exit of ﬁrm 2 for all θ1. Information sharing yields ac-
commodation for suﬃciently ineﬃcient technologies of ﬁrm 1 (i.e., θ1 > e θ
−1
(θ2)). This
increases the consumer surplus, since outputs expand, and product variety increases.
If θ2 is slightly lower than e θ(E{θ1}), an analogous intuition applies: information
sharing expands the average output levels, and thereby increases expected consumer
surplus.
6In models where ﬁrms choose accommodating output strategies the expected con-
sumer surplus is highest under information concealment (Shapiro, 1986). The propo-
sition shows that the surplus ranking is reversed when ﬁrm 2’s incentive to exit is
aﬀected by information sharing.
4 Strategic Information Disclosure
In this section I characterize ﬁrms’ interim information disclosure incentives. That
is, ﬁr m1c h o o s e sad i s c l o s u r er u l ed(θ1) ∈ {θ1,∅} after it privately learns the cost
θ1 for any θ1 ∈ [θ,θ]. The equilibrium outputs after disclosure of θ1 a r ea si n( 8 ) - ( 9 ) .
If ﬁrm 1 does not disclose its cost, then ﬁrm 2 expects the cost E{θ1|∅} of ﬁrm 1.




First, I show that there always exists an equilibrium with full disclosure.
Proposition 3 There always exists an equilibrium in which ﬁrm 1 discloses all in-
formation, i.e., d(θ1)=θ1 for any θ1 ∈ [θ,θ].
A full disclosure equilibrium exists if ﬁrm 2 holds skeptical beliefs, i.e. E{θ1|∅} =
θ. Given these beliefs, ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to disclose its cost θ1 for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ],
since it discourages output production by the competitor (i.e., x∗
2(θ2,θ 1) <x o
2(θ2;θ)
for all θ1 < θ). This is a standard unraveling result (Grossman, 1981, Milgrom, 1981,
and Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990). However, this equilibrium is not always unique.
In spite of the fact that the incentive to disclose information is stronger than in
the model with precommitment, there remain cases in which it is optimal for ﬁrm 1
to conceal. In particular, I ﬁnd the following for suﬃciently high costs of ﬁrm 2.
Proposition 4 If e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ), then for any subset D of the interval
[θ,e θ
−1
(θ2)] such that E{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D} ≤ e θ
−1




θ1, if θ1 ∈ D
∅, otherwise. (17)
The proposition has the following immediate implication.
Corollary 1 If e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ), then an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrm 1
keeps any cost secret, i.e. d(θ1)=∅ for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ].
7Proof. If D = ∅,t h e nE{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D} = E{θ1} ≤ e θ
−1
(θ2),s i n c ee θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2.
If e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ),a n dﬁrm 2 has beliefs consistent with full concealment
(i.e., E{θ1|∅} = E{θ1}), then ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to keep any cost secret. Given
these beliefs ﬁrm 2 exits the market, if ﬁrm 1 conceals its cost. By contrast, disclosure
would yield accommodating output strategies (i.e., x∗
2(θ2,θ 1) > 0=xo
2(θ2;E{θ1})),
if ﬁrm 1 is less eﬃcient than expected (i.e., θ1 >E {θ1}). It yields exclusion of ﬁrm
2, if ﬁr m1i sm o r ee ﬃcient than expected (i.e., θ1 ≤ E{θ1}). In other words, cost
concealment gives ﬁrm 1 proﬁts which are greater than or equal to the proﬁts under
disclosure.
A comparison of the proﬁts from the disclosure rules in Propositions 3 and 4 gives
the following. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt from full disclosure is π∗
1(θ1,θ 2). Under the conditions
of Proposition 4, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from disclosure rule (17) are πo
1(θ1,θ 2;E{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D}).
The proﬁt from disclosure rule (17) is greater than or equal to the proﬁtf r o mf u l l
disclosure, i.e., πo
1(θ1,θ 2;E{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D}) ≥ π∗
1(θ1,θ 2) for any θ1 and e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 <
e θ(θ),s i n c eﬁrm 2 is excluded more often from the market under disclosure rule (17).
5C o n c l u s i o n
I characterized the conditions under which a ﬁrm keeps its cost of production secret
in a Cournot duopoly. The possibility of exit by a competitor may give the ﬁrm an
incentive for secrecy. Whereas a ﬁrm typically prefers to share information about
independent cost parameters when the ﬁrms choose accommodating output strategies
in the product market, the ﬁrm may prefer to conceal cost information in cases where
its competitor can be excluded from the market. This result holds not only in a setting
where the ﬁrm precommits to share information, but also (though in fewer cases, and
not uniquely) in a setting in which the ﬁrm makes a strategic disclosure choice.
The possibility of exit also aﬀects the expected consumer surplus ranking. In cases
w h e r ee x i to c c u r sc o n s u m e r sm a yo na v e r a g eb eb e t t e ro ﬀ under information sharing.
By contrast, consumers prefer the equilibrium allocation under information conceal-
ment, when ﬁrms choose accommodating output strategies in the product market.
A possible extension to the analysis could be to introduce incomplete information
about ﬁrm 2’s cost. The paper’s results would still hold if ﬁrm 2’s cost is randomly
d r a w nf r o ma ni n t e r v a lw i t hi n e ﬃcient technologies (e.g., θ2 ∈ [max{θ
o,θ
∗},e θ(θ)]).
These observations provide a caveat for antitrust policy towards information shar-
ing in industries with asymmetric ﬁrms.
8A Appendix
This Appendix provides proofs to the propositions.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
First, if e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ),t h e nΠo
1(θ2) > Π∗
1(θ2),s i n c eπm(θ1) >π d
1(θ1,θ 2) for
all θ1 > e θ
−1















































(θ2)) = xd(e θ
−1




























The comparison of ﬁrst derivatives gives immediately dΠo
1(θ2)/dθ2 >d Π∗
1(θ2)/dθ2.










































The existence of the critical value θ
o,w i t he θ(θ) <θ
o < e θ(E{θ1}), follows directly
from the monotonicity of the expected proﬁtd i ﬀerence Πo
1(θ2) − Π∗
1(θ2),a n dt h e
observations Πo
1(e θ(E{θ1})) − Π∗
1(e θ(E{θ1})) > 0 and Πo
1(e θ(θ)) − Πo
1(e θ(θ)) < 0. ¤
9P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.




















































since S (xm(θ1),0) = S
¡
xd(θ1,θ 2),x d(θ2,θ 1)
¢
for θ1 = e θ
−1
(θ2),a n d






















d(θ2,θ 1) < 0
for all θ1 > e θ
−1
(θ2). Consequently, S∗(θ2) − So(θ2) >S ∗(e θ(θ)) − So(e θ(θ)) = 0.
Second, take e θ(θ) ≤ θ2 < e θ(E{θ1}). For these parameter values the consumer
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since dS(xd(θ1,θ 2),x d(θ2,θ 1))/dθ2 < 0 for all θ1 ≤ e θ
−1
(θ2) and θ2 < e θ(E{θ1}).T h e











































The existence of the critical value θ
o,w i t he θ(θ) <θ
∗ < e θ(E{θ1}),f o l l o w sd i r e c t l yf r o m
the monotonicity of the expected proﬁtd i ﬀerence So(θ2)−S∗(θ2), and the observations
So(e θ(E{θ1})) − S∗(e θ(E{θ1})) < 0 and So(e θ(θ)) − So(e θ(θ)) > 0. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The proof is similar to standard proofs of the unravelling result.
Suppose that ﬁrm 2 holds skeptical beliefs, i.e. E{θ1|∅} = θ. Given these beliefs,
ﬁrm 1 earns higher proﬁts under information disclosure than under concealment, since
x∗
1(θ1,θ 2) >x o
1(θ1,θ 2;θ) for all θ1 ∈ [θ,θ),a n dx∗
1(θ1,θ 2)=xo
1(θ1,θ 2;θ) for θ1 = θ.
Notice that the beliefs are consistent with the information disclosure incentives. ¤
11P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Suppose e θ(E{θ1}) ≤ θ2 < e θ(θ),a n dD ⊂ [θ,e θ
−1
(θ2)] is such that E{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D} ≤
e θ
−1
(θ2). Further, suppose that ﬁrm 2 holds beliefs consistent with disclosure rule






≥ e θ(E{θ1|θ1 / ∈ D}),a n dt h e r e f o r eﬁrm 1 receives
the proﬁt πm(θ1) under concealment. For all θ1 ≤ e θ
−1
(θ2) the proﬁt from disclosure
of θ1 is π∗
1(θ1,θ 2)=πm(θ1), and therefore disclosure of θ1 ∈ D and concealment
of θ1 ∈ [θ,e θ
−1
(θ2)]\D is optimal. For all θ1 > e θ
−1
(θ2) the proﬁt from disclosure
is π∗
1(θ1,θ 2)=xd(θ1,θ 2)2 <π m(θ1), and concealment is optimal. Hence, any type
θ1 / ∈ D has an incentive to conceal, and any type θ1 ∈ D has an incentive to disclose.
¤
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